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Se negat esse uirum Nature, factus in arte
Barbarus. Ars illi non placet, immo tropus.
Non tamen ista tropus poterit translatio dici.
In uicium melius ista figura cadit.1
[Becoming a barbarian in grammar, [the sodomite] disclaims the manhood given him
by nature. Grammar does not find favour with him but rather a trope. This transposi-
tion [translatio], however, cannot be called a trope. The figure here more correctly falls
into the category of defects [uicium, or vitium].2]
— Alan of Lille, The Plaint of Nature (Meter 1, lines 21-24)
Because Scriptural exegesis offered readers the only thing close to a systematic model for
textual interpretation during the High Middle Ages, problems arose when Christian
readers set out to explicate pagan literature. Unabashed representations of erotic, and
particularly homoerotic, desire in the works of Ovid proved to be particularly embar-
rassing to medieval exegetes seeking to demonstrate the efficacy of Christian allegori-
cal interpretation applied to profane works. Readers found themselves pressed to inter-
pret Ovidian representations of erotic desire as a figure for something else. But is it
really possible in this model of reading to evacuate literal sex from the text by making
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it a figure, especially given the importance of literal meaning as the grounding, or fon-
datio, of allegorical meaning? Is this use of figuration to evacuate literal sex not itself an
abuse or even a perversion of the exegetical process as it was understood to function?
Alan of Lille asks this very question in his allegorical work De planctu Naturae. For Alan
and authors influenced by his work, including Jean de Meun and Chaucer, sodomy
comes to name this particular exegetical dilemma. Nature’s complaint refers not so
much to the existence of sodomites in the world as it does to the representation of
sodomy in pagan literature and more precisely to the temptation the Christian reader
might feel to make it re-signify. The question of sodomy and the question of reading are
virtually inseparable in De planctu Naturae. Indeed, sodomy as a discursive category—
and along with it Western homophobia—arose out of the discursive practices of medieval
Christian exegesis. As Larry Scanlon explains,“Insofar as it imposes a teleology on modes
of pleasure, the ideal of a ‘natural’ sexuality is pre-eminently an interpretive or exeget-
ical one.”3
In effect, Alan of Lille’s De planctu Naturae, more than any other literary work of
its time, construes sodomy as inseparable from exegetical discourse. In it, an exegetical
problem is presented through an example of pagan representation of same-sex desire
while same-sex desire is presented as a dysfunction in allegorical meaning. In my read-
ing of De planctu Naturae, I begin to outline what might be called a rhetoric of sodomy,
that is, a more or less systematic taxonomy of the tropes associated with sodomy—
namely, metalepsis and translatio—and of their particular function(s) in the works that
use them. I claim that the desire of the Christian exegete to read sex out of pagan works
produces the spectre of the sodomitic body which comes to figure exegetical dysfunc-
tion and ultimately mirrors the reader’s desire back to him.
In recent years, a number of scholars have read De planctu Naturae with an eye to
situating sexuality in relationship to exegetical discourse.4 Alexandre Leupin’s ground-
breaking Barbarolexis places Alan in a lineage of medieval writers who deliberately high-
light the gaps and flaws of referential language in order to bring attention to, rather
than veil, the alterity and unrepresentability of desire. He is the first to interpret the
rhetorical excesses of De planctu Naturae as a deliberately self-reflexive gesture. More
importantly, Leupin’s method of reading, which takes Alan’s own prescribed method and
172 Michael A. Johnson
3 Scanlon, “Unspeakable Pleasures,” 235.
4 See, for example, Leupin, Barbarolexis, especially 59-78; Scanlon, “Unspeakable Pleasures”; Pittenger,
“Explicit Ink”; Jordan, The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology; Burgwinkle, Sodomy, Masculin-
ity, and Law in Medieval Literature; and Guynn, Allegory and Sexual Ethics.
turns it on itself, reading it against the grain, has marked all subsequent readings, includ-
ing my own. Mark Jordan’s The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology, along simi-
lar lines, complicates Alan of Lille’s rhetorical stance in relation to sodomy. Jordan’s
argument cautions readers from assuming that De planctu Naturae is an invective directed
against homosexuals5 and suggests that Alan might in fact be more concerned with the
use or misuse of pagan poetry in Christian theology. While I agree with Jordan, I am also
wary of concluding too quickly that Alan’s work is concerned only with linguistic or
literary abuses.6 In my view, this critical tendency represents yet another instance of
giving in to the temptation to read sodomy as a figure for something else, a reading that
I would suggest is already scripted into the text. In her 1996 article on De planctu Natu-
rae, Elizabeth Pittenger warns against this: “The problem with generalized notions of ‘per-
version’ and ‘language’ is that they efface the specificity of the concrete registers triggered
by the representations of sexuality and writing in the text, thereby making it difficult for
us to conceptualize the erotic materiality of reading.”7 Following Pittenger’s articulation
of the question, I will argue through a close reading of the representation of Ganymede
in De planctu Naturae that it is the erotic materiality of reading that both drives medieval
readers to allegorize sexual referents and makes this allegoresis ultimately impossible.
The pervasive figure of the sodomitic body names the erotic materiality of reading in
medieval letters, and in Alan’s work it is the sodomitic body of Ganymede that holds this
function.
De planctu Naturae is a notoriously difficult text. A theological allegory in densely
written prosimetry, composed sometime between 1160 and 1180, the work gives voice
to a personified Lady Nature arguing in defence of procreative orthodoxy. The work’s
English translator James Sheridan, who has translated much of Alan’s other work,
describes the Latin of De planctu Naturae as the most difficult he has ever encountered:
“Throughout most of the work there are two layers of meaning and in a number of
places there are three.”8 Sheridan’s complaint refers specifically to the famous sex-gram-
mar metaphors scattered throughout Alan’s prose, metaphors which refer, for example,
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to masturbation as a reflexive verb, to bisexuality as a heteroclite noun, and to copula-
tion between a man and a woman as a subject-verb-predicate construction. While a
number of studies make mention of the sex-grammar metaphors in De planctu Natu-
rae, Jan Ziolkowski approaches Alan’s use of grammatical metaphors most systematically.9
In the present study I take the body-language comparison, implied by the sex-gram-
mar metaphor, as a starting point. The putative ontological continuity between lan-
guage and the body, assumed by this comparison, is what enables Alan to refer to same-
sex desire as an abuse of both grammatical and rhetorical norms. Whether or not he
himself took this ontological continuity as a given, one can see in this comparison the
extent to which his conception of same-sex desire was in fact shaped by the exegetical
tradition. To be specific, he saw a parallel in the rhetorical conception of the relation
between literal and figurative meaning and the theological division of ordered and
sodomitic bodies. Sodomitic desire for Alan is a figure for various types of interruptions,
short-circuits and failures to ground, in the functioning of allegorical meaning.
In the following section I outline Alan of Lille’s use of exegetical terminology, focus-
ing particularly on the ways in which he understood the division of literal and figura-
tive meaning to function. I explain how Alan was able to view sodomy both as an abuse
of the literal and as an abuse of the figurative. Finally, I examine a passage in De planctu
Naturae where the pagan representation of same-sex desire—in this case Ovid’s telling
of the rape of Ganymede—gives rise to speculation about the power of exegesis to read
same-sex desire as a figure for a nobler Christian truth.
Alan’s sex-grammar metaphor assumes thorough knowledge of the exegetical tra-
dition, a body of writing that enacted a number of debates concerning the relationship
of grammar to rhetoric, and of both grammar and rhetoric to truth. For medieval
exegetes, the line between grammar and rhetoric—that is, between the literal and the fig-
urative—was a difficult one to draw. Figurative uses of language were understood as
either a transfer (translatio) or a turn away from (tropus) proper meaning. A translatio
or tropus could either be classified as a figure of speech (figura) or a grammatical error
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(vitium), depending on one’s interpretation. It becomes an error on the grounds that it
is an abuse of the proper, while a successful figure, although an abuse of the proper all
the same, is justified on the grounds of its utility and truth-value. If a translatio attains
the status of figura it becomes the concern of rhetoricians, but if it fails and falls into the
category of vitium it is the concern of grammarians. In theory, the grammarian is con-
cerned with the proper (proper meaning/the properties of a part of speech) while the
rhetorician is more concerned with questions of use-value—to what end is this figure
being used?—and truth-value—is there a deeper truth behind the untruth at the sur-
face of the translatio?
Figurative uses of language, even when justified, always threaten to become ends in
themselves, which will lead the reader astray. Only proper uses of language—in other
words, literal, non-figurative, non-catachretic modes of reference—would seem to guar-
antee unequivocal truth. But as Henri de Lubac’s monumental study of medieval exe-
gesis explains, the literal mode of reference, comfortingly straightforward as it may have
been, was considered dangerous if mistaken for an end unto itself:
Under the name “letter,” in a language that Saint Paul had fixed, the Christian therefore
rejects and ought to reject not every “literal sense,” but, once again, the “mere letter,” or
the “naked history,” the letter whose keeping would equivalently be the rejection of the
larger meaning. […]
If it is a question of practice, the letter that is rejected is that of carnal observances.10
De Lubac demonstrates in fact that the letter might have been more problematic than
the figure in the medieval exegetical tradition because the letter was associated with the
body of Christ, which, if kept at the level of the “mere letter,” would come to index noth-
ing more than “carnal observances.” As such, the literal dimension of a text would ref-
erence materiality and embodiment, thus being marked feminine. If Scripture were to
fall into the wrong hands and interpretation were to remain at the “mere letter,” or the
“naked history,” or if the text in question were, for instance, Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the
reader might be capable of producing nothing more than mere flesh, body without
spirit.
Therefore, the allegorical referent must signify properly on the literal register in a
first step on the way to figurative signification. It must first be posited as a referent
that can be named and denoted transparently before it can become an allegorical sig-
nifier. If it fails to refer transparently or if the reader fails to move beyond the literal
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meaning, the literal referent becomes an end in itself. While the literal had to serve as
foundation for the figurative, the figurative had to depart from, or disengage from, the
literal. In other words, the literal and the figurative were acknowledged to be of alto-
gether different orders, to be absolutely incommensurable. As de Lubac puts it,“the order
of the spirit [i.e., the figurative] founded upon history [i.e., the literal] and disengaged
from history.”11
Both the literal and the figurative dimensions of the text provoke anxiety in their
capacity to go awry if ever made ends in themselves. Figurative uses of language, as
deviations from proper meaning, must be justified as means to some higher end or else
they become abuses of the proper simply for the sake of abuse. Literal uses of language,
although adherent to proper meaning, threaten to mire the reader in the pleasures of the
flesh if taken for ends in themselves. Each level of meaning (be it literal or figurative)
threatens to become an end in itself. Fallen into the wrong hands, for example, the erotic
love represented in the Song of Songs becomes nothing more than erotic love: its capac-
ity to teach, its truth-claim as Scripture, is interrupted by the exclusively literal interpre-
tation. One can only imagine, then, how problematic it must have been to make literal
representations of erotic love from pagan works have meaning for Christian readers.
Readers trained in Scriptural exegesis were not able to rely on a long established tradi-
tion of allegorical interpretation (as they could with the Song of Songs) when con-
fronted with candid representations of sexuality in the writings of Ovid and Virgil. If
Ovid’s Metamorphoses is to be a Christian allegory—and most of it does lend itself to
effortless allegorical interpretation—representations of non-normative desire would
have to be evacuated by being made figures for something else.
Sodomitic desire—that is, homoerotic and other disordered desires—arises prima-
rily as an exegetical dilemma for Alan of Lille. He articulates the question of sodomitic
desire in relation to the anxiety that the literal and the figurative provoke in their capac-
ity to become ends in themselves. To be precise, sodomitic desire arises as a figure both
for ungrounded and interrupted allegorical meaning in De planctu Naturae, always
appearing at moments when the interrelationship of literal and figurative meaning is
placed explicitly into question.
To begin with, sodomy is an abuse of the literal, an abuse of “proper” meaning. As
the “sin against nature,” sodomy not only offends Nature, but also has a denaturing
effect on mankind. That sodomy denatures man is another way of saying that sodomy
is an abuse of the proper, that it turns man away from man’s proper meaning. Philosoph-
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ical and theological notions of the natural, especially allegorical personifications of
nature, are connected to grammatical notions of the proper in medieval writing. Lady
Nature hence becomes the guardian of proper meaning and the “sin against nature,” by
extension, an abuse of the proper.
The sodomite betrays the proper meaning of man by denying reproduction and
thus his animal-corporeal nature. A violation of animal nature (i.e., the teleology of the
body) was tantamount to a violation of the literal. According to the logic of allegorical
meaning—which requires the literal to function transparently before it can have figu-
rative meaning—man cannot have spiritual meaning without first fulfilling his literal
(i.e., corporeal) meaning. If man denies his animal nature he cannot fulfill his spiritual
nature.
If man fails to signify literally, the stability of the sign man/man (signifier/signified)
can no longer be guaranteed. In the context of medieval sign theory, which assumed
one-to-one correspondence between signified and signifier, any abuse of the proper will
affect the continuity between language and nature, between language and being. In
medieval neoplatonic thought, of which Alan is exemplary, the notion of “nature” pro-
vided a way for being as such to be thought. A violation of nature was ultimately a vio-
lation of being. The literal dimension of a text was the concern of grammarians, whose
task was to establish a solid foundation for the revelation of truth by assuring locatable
and stable correspondence between signifieds and signifiers, between the elements of
nature and the elements of language. As John of Salisbury says in his Metalogicon, “gram-
mar prepares the mind to understand everything that can be taught in words.”12 This
everything John writes of encompasses all of nature—all that can be known in the sim-
plest deictic mode of speech. Language in the literal mode participated in the same
order of being as the natural world, while language in the figurative mode was thought
to be able to designate divine matters, but not able to participate in the same order of
being as things divine. In his Summa “Quoniam homines,” Alan explains,
Item dictiones ideo invente sunt ad significandum naturalia; postea ad theologiam
translate. Itaque secundum primam institutionem naturalia designant, secundum vero
translationem divina significant. Itaque naturalibus proprie, divinis vero inproprie con-
veniunt.
[Similarly, words are for that reason invented in order to signify natural things and are
only afterward transferred [translate] to theology. Thus in accordance with their first
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application they designate natural matters, while in accordance with metaphoric trans-
ference [translationem] they signify divine matters. Thus they are properly serviceable
for natural matters, but on the contrary improperly for divine ones.13]
When Alan refers to words (dictiones) in the last sentence, he makes it clear that the
meaning of “words” does not include words whose meaning has been transferred figu-
ratively. Thus, when he says “words are only properly serviceable for natural matters,”
Alan refers exclusively to the proper meaning of words. Figurative language does not
count as words because it has denatured words in order to signify divine matters while
words, as long as they signify properly, participate within the natural world and are
hence ontologically continuous with it. Translatio is thus a trope concerned with being.
Notions of the proper in medieval rhetoric always reference a certain adherence to being,
while notions of translatio reference a—sometimes necessary, but always dangerous—
breaking away from or violation of being.
It is exactly this kind of perilous violation of being that is at stake in the highly
improper and abusive translatio of meaning that sodomy names. One particularly salient
description of sodomy as an abusive translatio of the proper meaning of man can be
found in Paul of Hungary’s Summa of Penance.14 In a poetic depiction, he describes the
properties of the waters of Sodom and Gomorrah: a piece of iron will float to the sur-
face of the water while a feather will sink to the bottom. Paul’s floating iron and sink-
ing feather describe the effect translatio has on proper meaning. What is proper to iron
is to sink, and what is proper to feathers is to float; but mere proximity to the burnt-out
city of Sodom causes the iron and feathers to betray their properties, their proper mean-
ing. Paul’s choice of light/heavy for the properties violated by sodomitic abuse of the
proper is rhetorically powerful, since the light/heavy opposition references the opposi-
tion between up and down, between the heavens and the earth. To ignore the hierarchy
of up and down is essentially to violate the fundamental order of being. The sodomitic
image of floating iron and sinking feathers is an example of this violation of being, a vio-
lation of being which disrupts the order of the natural world—specifically, that most fun-
damental order separating the above from the below.
But in addition to being an abusive translatio that threatens the capacity of words
to adhere to things via proper meaning, sodomy also names an incorrect “use” of body
and language. This abusive “use” of body and language calls into question the teleology
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of both body and language. To return to the description of sodomy as the “sin against
nature,” it is important to remember that Alan draws from a tradition dating back to Paul
in which “the sin against nature” is described as an usus, a word whose meaning bridges
the rhetorical and the corporeal. Paul refers to same-sex desire specifically as the “usu[s]
qui est contra naturam.”15 One of the word’s primary meanings is custom or habit, a
notion that has both a rhetorical and a corporeal aspect to it. In classical and medieval
rhetoric usus describes the positing of meaning in certain grammatical propositions—
the word often appears in evaluations of figurative language: is this an abusive “use” of
metaphor or is it justified? Implicit in this idea of proper use, both in terms of sex and
grammar, is a cause/effect structure. To say that a sexual act or a grammatical proposi-
tion must be useful is to say that the body or language must be a means to an end, and
not an end unto itself. This kind of logic is commonplace in the theological writings con-
cerning “the sin against nature.” Aquinas exploits it thoroughly in his Summa, as Jordan
demonstrates:
For Thomas, true pleasure is the effect of natural completion, of the fulfillment of nat-
ural teleology. The Sodomitic vice radically disrupts the most obvious continuities of
animal nature. Yet the cause of this violently antinatural sin is the intensity of the pleas-
ure it yields—a pleasure so intense that it “dissolves the soul.” But it is not only the
intensity that is troubling: Thomas here confronts a kind of pleasure that cannot be
divided without remainder into teleological sequences. He confronts a pleasure with-
out end. He names the possibility of this pleasure the antithesis of nature.16
Thus, for Thomas, sodomy is disruptive because it brings about a pleasure that cannot
be subsumed to any system of meaning. A “pleasure without end” describes pleasure that
does not have procreation as its end, pleasure that has become an end in itself. This for-
mulation has a parallel in the disciplines of rhetoric and dialectic, which view the tele-
ology of meaning in the same way Thomas views the teleology of pleasure. Rhetorical
terminology uses the term metalepsis to describe precisely the violation of the teleology
of means/end that Thomas describes sodomy as bringing about. Metalepsis is defined
as the logical error of taking the means for the end, which can sometimes be used for
rhetorical effect, but which most of the time simply constitutes a flaw in reasoning. Met-
aleptic tropes are often used to describe sodomy in theological and poetic writing of
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the Middle Ages. The description of sodomy as metalepsis can be found in Paul of Hun-
gary’s Summa of Penance. In his poetic depiction of the waters of Sodom and Gomor-
rah, Paul describes the shore of these waters where he finds trees bearing apples that are
appealing to look at, but are either filled with ashes or disappear or explode at the touch.
These beautiful but inedible apples are the image of metalepsis. Here, the apple’s
beauty has become an end in itself. An apple’s beauty should be the cause for it to be eaten,
and being eaten, the final effect. If beauty is taken as an end in itself, then the apple’s pur-
pose, its teleology, is ignored. The beautiful but inedible apples of Sodom are the image
of cause mistaken for effect. Correspondingly, the sodomite mistakes sex for an end in
itself, ignoring the teleology of reproduction. Or as Jordan puts it, sodomy takes pleas-
ure as an end in itself, becoming a “pleasure without end” that cannot be parsed into tele-
ological sequences. Sodomites are guilty of a metaleptic flaw of reasoning.
In the rhetorical terms I have been using—which Alan exploits fully—it is specifi-
cally the abuse of figurative language (vitium, or “vice”) that is conceived in metaleptic
terms. Donatus defines vitium, using a means/end formulation, as a “deviatio a fine…sine
causa excusante” (deviation in effect without justifiable cause).17 It goes one step beyond
the abuse of the proper discussed above. While translatio can be justified if it is to the
end of revealing divine truth, deviation from proper meaning—when it has no pur-
pose other than the pleasure of deviation itself—becomes an abuse of the very system
of meaning that allows it. It is according to these terms that Alan’s narrator is able to
denounce sodomy as a defective trope, as he does in the opening meter section of De
planctu:
Se negat esse uirum Nature, factus in arte
Barbarus. Ars illi non placet, immo tropus.
Non tamen ista tropus poterit translatio dici.
In uicium melius ista figura cadit.18
[Becoming a barbarian in grammar, he disclaims the manhood given him by nature.
Grammar does not find favour with him but rather a trope. This transposition [trans-
latio], however, cannot be called a trope. The figure here more correctly falls into the
category of defects [uicium].]
The narrator here refers to sodomy as a defective trope that fails even to qualify as a
trope in the end. The sodomite slips out of grammar, out of the literal into the figura-
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tive, first as a trope, but finally arriving at the status of vitium (literally “vice”). The slip-
page Alan’s narrator depicts here in fact corresponds neatly to the two abuses described
above in relation to sodomy. The sodomite first abuses grammar by dislocating the lit-
eral (i.e., the proper) meaning of man. This abuse, a translatio, brings him into the fig-
urative dimension of language. But as Alan writes, the sodomite cannot even properly
be called a figure because he fails to perform as a figure is supposed to according to the
exegetical model, which subsumes figurative language to the teleology of Christian truth.
Not pointing to any truth beyond his own dislocation of proper meaning, the sodomite
becomes an end in itself, not a figure but a vitium, the very definition of metalepsis.
Given this understanding of the sodomite as a vitium, it is not surprising that the
spectre of sodomitic desire resurfaces once again in the midst of a debate regarding alle-
gorical interpretation. In Prose Four, Lady Nature continues the pedagogical dialogue
begun in Prose Three. After hearing Nature elaborate an exhaustive taxonomy of sex-
ual perversions, the narrator wonders why she focused her attack on humanity if the poets
have also represented the gods practising sexual sins against nature:
Miror cur poetarum commenta retractans, solummodo in humani generis pestes pre-
dictarum inuectionum armas aculeos, cum et eodem exorbitationis pede deos claudi-
casse legamus.19
[I wonder why, when you consider the statements of the poets, you load the stings of
the above attacks against the contagions of the human race alone, although we read
that the gods too, have limped around the same circle of aberration.]
He follows with the Ovidian example of the rape of Ganymede, which he retells, describ-
ing Ganymede’s abduction as a translatio:
Iupiter enim, adolescentem Frigium transferens ad superna, relatiuam Venerem transtulit
in translatum. Et quem in mensa per diem propinandi sibi prefecit propositum, in thoro
per noctem sibi fecit suppositum.20
[Jupiter, translating the Phrygian youth to the realms above, transferred there a propor-
tionate love for him on his transference. The one he had made his wine-master by day
he made his subject in bed by night.]
Nature responds by accusing the narrator of taking the poets at face value, of reading
too literally. This launches Nature into her frequently quoted discourse on the question
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of poetic truth. All poetry, because it is a translatio of proper meaning, is a kind of lie,
she claims. But poetic lies occur in three different modalities, which readers must learn
to distinguish from one another: a purely denotative modality, a falsely denotative
modality, and a figurative modality. She explains,
An ignoras quomodo poete sine omni palliationis remedio auditoribus nudam falsitatem
prostituunt, ut quadam mellite delectationis dulcedine uelut incantatas audientium
aures inebrient? Aut ipsam falsitatem quadam probabilitatis ypocrisi palliant, ut per
exemplorum imagines hominum animos inhoneste morigerationis incude sigillent?
Aut in superficiali littere cortice falsum resonat lira poetica, interius uero auditoribus
secretum intelligentie altioris eloquitur, ut exteriori falsitatis abiecto putamine dul-
ciorem nucleum ueritatis secrete intus lector inueniat.21
[Do you not know how the poets present falsehood, naked and without the protection
of a covering, to their audience so that by a certain sweetness of honeyed pleasure, they
may, so to speak, intoxicate the bewitched ears of their hearers? Or, how they cover
falsehood with a kind of imitation of probability so that, by a presentation of precedents,
they may seal the minds of men with a stamp from the anvil of shameful tolerance?
Or, how the poetic lyre gives a false note on the outer bark of the composition but
within tells the listeners a secret of deeper significance so that when the outer shell of
falsehood has been discarded the reader finds the sweeter kernel of truth hidden within?]
Thus there are three kinds of lies in poetry: first, lies presented in the literal mode (naked
lies), which seduce because of something intrinsic in the lie represented; secondly, lies
covered in false figures, which seduce in their figurative aspect, but which remain lies
nonetheless; and thirdly, truth covered in figures, which are only lies insofar as figures
must dislocate proper meaning in order to reveal another order of truth.
The gist of her argument is that it is important to understand that poetry has
both a surface meaning (literal) and a depth meaning (figurative), which often (per-
haps always) betray one another. It is up to the reader to decide whether there is more
truth at the surface of the text or beneath the surface. This argument is crucial because
it justifies Alan’s own use of a poetic allegory—highly reliant on classical poetic mod-
els and pagan allegory—for the purposes of theological argumentation. But what
needs to be underscored here is that this canonically important theoretical moment
in De planctu Naturae, in which a rather comprehensive theory of poetic truth is artic-
ulated, itself follows a question about the pagan representation of same-sex desire.
Given that it is presented as a response to a question about the representation of same-
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sex desire, can Nature’s theory of poetic truth account for this representation? In other
words, can pagan representations of same-sex desire have meaning for the Christian
theologian?
While Nature’s discourse on poetic truth calls the truth-value of the pagan poets and
any secular poetry into question, it does not answer the question whether this particu-
lar Ovidian scene—the representation of same-sex desire that spurs her theory—can have
meaning for Christians. She does not declare whether it is possible to read these scenes
allegorically. While she warns the narrator about the three varieties of poetic falsehood,
Nature does not explain what specific kind of poetic falsehood the story of Jupiter and
Ganymede constitutes. Is it one of the first two kinds, designed either to seduce or to trick
the reader into committing sin? Or is it the third kind, a poetic lie that hides a deeper
truth beneath the surface of its figurative artifice? Nature seems to suggest the latter—
first, to the extent that she often uses Ovidian examples herself to bolster her arguments
and, second, in that she insists on the dangers of literal reading, which can be remedied
only by reading allegorically. This is clearest in the conclusion of her discourse:
Quia ergo, ut poete testati sunt, plerique homines predicamentalibus Veneris ter-
minis ad litteram sunt abusi, narratio uero illa, que uel deos esse uel ipsos in Veneris gig-
nasiis lasciuisse mentitur, in nimie falsitatis uesperascit occasum; ista nube taciturni-
tatis obduxi, illa uero in lucem uere narrationis explicui.22
[Because then, many men, as we know from the testimony of the poets, have misused,
by a literal interpretation, the terms applied to Venus, this account of theirs which falsely
states that there is a plurality of gods or that these gods have wantoned in the play-
grounds of Venus […]. Over these statements [the literal interpretation] I draw the
cloud of silence, the ones preceding them [Christian truth] I unfold to the light of
truthful narrative.]
Nature draws a cloud of silence over the literal interpretation of the pagan poets because
the literal is corporeal, of the same order as animal nature, which is mute. It is only
through explicatio23 (literally “unfolding,” “revealing to view”) that the light of Chris-
tian truth can be revealed in this poetry. Through Nature’s explicatio, pagan poetry
goes from a cloud of silence (“nube taciturnitatis”) to the light of truthful narrative
(“lucem uere narrationis”), from falsehood to truth. What is at stake is the possibility
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for figurative language to transfer meaning, from the literal signification of same-sex
desire to a nobler allegorical signification. But the question remains—is there an alle-
gorical truth hidden beneath the apparent falsehood at the surface of the story of
Ganymede’s translatio? And further, what specific allegorical message would the rape of
Ganymede hold for Christian readers of Ovid?
Alan, at least, does have an allegorical interpretation of Jupiter and Ganymede in
mind. As indicated above, the word choice in the narrator’s description of the scene is
conspicuous. He uses words such as transfer/translatum (metaphor, transposition, trans-
fer), suppositum (having been placed beneath or subjoined both physically and in writ-
ing or speech), propositum (having been placed in front of both physically and in writ-
ing or speech, proposed, stated as fact) and relativam (brought back, reciprocal, recalled
in speech or writing by similarity) to describe the relationship between Jupiter and
Ganymede, words which, in addition to having a straightforward physical-literal mean-
ing, have a clear meaning in the disciplines of grammar and rhetoric. Since Nature
accuses him of reading too literally, one can assume that the narrator intended transla-
tio in its most literal-corporeal sense as a physical displacement of Ganymede’s body
from the earth to the heavens. Nature’s theory of poetic falsehood can thus be read as
a response to the double meaning of those words that refer literally to the displacement
of Ganymede’s body, but figuratively to various rhetorical manoeuvres. The allegorical
meaning of the story was hidden in the figurative meaning of these seemingly corpo-
real words, a figurative meaning to which the narrator was blind because he could not
see beyond the veil of the body, beyond the literal dimension. This is all the more crim-
inal since the “figurative” meaning is in fact part of these words’ proper meaning. The
words refer “properly” to various rhetorical and grammatical functions, and the conspic-
uous emphasis on translatio leads one to suspect that the allegorical interpretation of
Ganymede will have something to do with the very workings of figurative language.24
The double meaning of translatio, and the particularity of that doubleness, suggests
that the story of Ganymede can be read as an allegory of interpretation, that is, as a rep-
resentation through poetic artifice of the doubleness of the allegorical text split between
its surface and depth meaning.
With this in mind I cite the passage here once again, in order to determine what such
an allegorical interpretation might look like.
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Iupiter enim, adolescentem Frigium transferens ad superna, relatiuam Venerem transtulit
in translatum. Et quem in mensa per diem propinandi sibi prefecit propositum, in thoro
per noctem sibi fecit suppositum.25
[Jupiter, translating the Phrygian youth to the realms above, transferred there a propor-
tionate love for him on his transference. The one he had made his wine-master by day
he made his subject in bed by night.]
Ganymede has a double structure. The verb transfero/translatum functions as a sort of
switch-between: he is “transferred” from earth to the heavens; Jupiter “transfers” his
love to an equivalent love for Ganymede; his function is “transferred” from day to night,
and Jupiter “transfers” him from an active role (propositum) to a passive one (supposi-
tum), from the public realm to the private, from wine-boy to lover. The doubleness of
Ganymede—both active and passive, earthly and divine, diurnal and nocturnal, wine-
master and sex slave—imitates the doubled structure of a text that has both a literal
and figurative meaning. Like the literal dimension of a text, which reveals truth only
through the interpretive effort of figural reading, earthly Ganymede must be “trans-
ferred,” through an elevation upward, in order for the divine Jupiter to be able to pos-
sess him. For this reason, the most important translatio Ganymede undergoes is the
move from earth to the heavens (transferens ad superna), from the earthly to the divine.
Just as Nature creates a binary distinction—inside/outside, veiled/unveiled—in her dis-
cussion of literal and figurative meaning, the use of the word supernus (literally “above,”
“heavens”) places Ganymede in an above/below binary which imitates the relation of the
literal to the figurative.
As for the words propositum and suppositum, which are used to describe Ganymede’s
two tasks as both wine-boy and lover, they too have a rhetorical meaning in addition
to a physical one. Moreover, the way they are set in contrast here suggests one might read
these words as referencing literal and figurative meaning. Propositum refers to Ganymede’s
“placement” as Jupiter’s wine-master, but another common meaning of “proponere” is
“to put on display.”26 As Henri de Lubac and others have argued, the literal meaning of
a text was associated with the immediately visible in the medieval imagination.27 The
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literal meaning was that aspect of a text which is put on display. Ganymede, as Jupiter’s
wine-master is a public figure, put on display in the wine-hall (“in mensa…propinandi”),
in full daylight (“per diem”), visible and knowable to all by virtue of his task. But this
aspect of Ganymede’s existence is only the surface beneath which his true task, and
truest meaning, is secretly hidden. To this extent, Ganymede’s propositum references the
literal dimension of a text which is visible and knowable to all but which hides secret
truths that require one to “transfer” its meaning to another level. Suppositum refers to
Ganymede’s subjection (literally “placement beneath”) to Jupiter in bed. The above/
beneath binary here references the relation of literal to figurative meaning. Figurative
meaning is always hidden, veiled beneath the flesh of the literal meaning, which must
be unveiled to reveal the figurative meaning. Thus allegorically, Ganymede’s double-
ness—having been placed simultaneously above and beneath—comes to signify the
paradoxically simultaneous existence of literal and figurative meaning in one signifier.
But if the doubleness of Ganymede allegorizes the dual levels in the allegorical text, how
then should one read the abduction or translatio that Jupiter operates, a translatio that
accounts for this very doubleness?
In their relationship, Ganymede is a kind of textual object whose meaning gets
transferred (translatum) through the arbitration of a powerful auctor (Jupiter). As the
god of gods, Jupiter has the power to “translate” Ganymede from a mortal to an immor-
tal being, to raise him from one order of being to another. Jupiter the lover thus becomes
a figure for the reader of allegory, invested with divine authority. The figure of Jupiter
as lover/reader posits the reader as an active subject whose reading enacts a translatio
upon the passive literal dimension of the text. Jupiter’s love for, and action upon,
Ganymede would thus come, allegorically, to signify a certain encounter between reader
and text. This encounter would be here allegorized as driven by love and desire: the
reader, like Jupiter, “loves” the text so much that he is driven to “lift” or translate its lit-
eral meaning into a “higher” meaning. The rape of Ganymede would, in other words,
bring to the foreground the desire that propels even the most Christian of allegorical inter-
pretation: the desire to “abduct” that is, to lift up and elevate the literal meaning into a
“higher” one. What allows this elevation to take place?
Jupiter, out of love, translates Ganymede’s body, from earth to heaven, from the
wine hall to the bedroom, from day to night, from wine-boy to lover, from active to
passive. In each of these transfers, Ganymede is the direct object of the verb. The pas-
sage makes it clear that Jupiter is driven to transfer Ganymede’s body by his love,
which is itself the direct object of a translatio, having been transferred onto Ganymede’s
body—“relatiuam Venerem transtulit” (he transferred [to Ganymede] proportionate
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love).28 Thus, two “transfers” occur: one of Ganymede’s body and one onto Ganymede’s
body. As Sheridan reads it in his English translation of De planctu Naturae, Jupiter
translates his love from heterosexual to homosexual love, from Juno to Ganymede as
though they were equivalent. But the textual logic of this passage, which invites alle-
gorical reading, requires the reader to account more scrupulously for the adjective
relativam, which modifies Jupiter’s love. The verb form refero has several meanings,
including: “to return,” “to bring back,” “to repeat,” and “to call to mind by similarity”
among other things, which makes it possible to read “relativam Venerem,” as mean-
ing a love that was (for) the same. Relativam, here, would refer in fact to the sameness
in their same-sex desire. Jupiter thus “translates” Ganymede because he is driven by
a desire for sameness. If the scene functions as an allegory of allegory, as I am suggest-
ing it does, then what does Jupiter’s love tell us about the desire that drives the uplift-
ing movement of allegorical interpretation?
Jupiter’s love for Ganymede is described as qualitatively different from his other
extramarital loves. While the women he seduces are beautiful things he wishes to pos-
sess, Ganymede is described as a beautiful thing Jupiter wishes to be. His love for
Ganymede is a question of being, not having. As Ovid’s version tells it, Ganymede was
someone Jupiter wanted to be: “quod Iuppiter esse, / quam quod erat, mallet” (whom
Jupiter wanted to be more than what he was).29 In Ovid’s version, which Alan clearly knew
well, sameness is articulated in concretely ontological terms as an identification. Lov-
ing someone of the same sex involves an identification of some sort, which might fol-
low such varied formulas as “I am like him” or “I want to be like him” or even “that is
me.” Identification is at the core of the mechanics of metaphor, which must posit an
identification before a transfer of meaning can succeed. In the narrator’s retelling of
the Ovidian story, Jupiter’s love-for-the-same, having been “transferred” onto Ganymede’s
body, impels him to “transfer” Ganymede’s body to the heavens. This mimics the struc-
ture of metaphor, which necessitates the translatio of identification—what is often
referred to as a connecting bridge of metaphor—as a condition for the translatio of
meaning that characterizes metaphor. In other words, allegorical reading is always pred-
icated on a moment of identification. In this allegory of allegorical interpretation, Jupiter,
the masterful reader, must identify with Ganymede, must love only in the way same can
love same, in order to transfer or translate Ganymede’s meaning/essence.
This would seem to suggest a complete, successful allegorical interpretation of
the Ovidian representation of same-sex desire. The sex between them would come to
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figure the encounter between a reader and a text, one that necessitates a passive/active
structure. And the sameness between them would come to figure the necessary identi-
fication, the passion for sameness that drives allegorical interpretation and which alone
enables the allegorical reader to elevate the literal meaning by invoking its similarity
with a higher, nobler meaning. Same-sex desire would figure the metaphorical bridge
upon which allegorical interpretation relies in order to ennoble meaning.
But something very strange happens when the reader tries to turn the representa-
tion of same-sex desire, through a conscious effort of allegorical interpretation, into an
allegory of interpretation. The very gesture of interpreting the rape of Ganymede as an
allegory of reading necessitates an identification. The very effort to read sodomy as a fig-
ure requires the reader to target a point of identification. But the only figure with which
the Christian allegorical reader can identify is Jupiter, that is, a sodomite. The story of
Ganymede, in other words, brings the reader closer to Jupiter and implicitly closer to
same-sex desire. The allegory’s self-reflexive structure traps the reader, who attempts to
convert sodomy into a figure, in a mode of reading that looks suspiciously sodomitic.
Like Jupiter, he must acknowledge that he is driven by a desire for the same that drives
him to transfer meaning from one term to another.
Although Christian readers may have tried to dispense with same-sex desire by
reading it as a figure for a nobler truth, the only figural reading they can provide turns
same-sex desire into a figure for reading, a sort of mirror which, far from evacuating
desire, highlights it. Same-sex desire, even when read figurally, can only figure and send
back the sodomitic quality of allegorical reading itself. Moreover, the figural reading of
same-sex desire points to no truth beyond the truth of this sodomitic quality of read-
ing. It is, in this sense, a failed or defective figure which can never succeed in pointing
to a truth beyond the effort of interpretation itself. Sodomy will always fail as a figure
because it mirrors the sameness necessary to figuration and short-circuits the teleol-
ogy of meaning, which requires figures to point beyond their own working.
Aware of this aporia, Alan of Lille used the paradox of a regulatory Lady Nature to
bring his readers to it. This paradox, I would suggest, accounts for the dizzying sense of
referential slippage in the allegory. Alan does not target readers tempted by the sin of
sodomy but works to illustrate the particular aporia that arises from the attempt to read
sex as a figure for something else. On the one hand, De planctu Naturae represents a
warning against this perverse enterprise of reading the sex out of pagan literature, while,
on the other hand, Alan’s work represents a florid, even pleasurable, elaboration of
sodomy’s unique power to name the erotic materiality of language. At this point it is
important to recall that Nature’s advice to the narrator, and to anyone faced with this
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aporia, is to flee. Yet the narrator does not flee. He chooses instead to enter the desirous
labyrinth of reading and to risk perversion and perdition. And it is precisely to the extent
that it takes the reader into this labyrinth that one might claim De planctu Naturae as a
queer text.
St. John Fisher College
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